Publication: Journal of Military Transportation University, Vol.18 No.7 July 2016

# Title: Analysis on the Psychological Elements of Decision Makers in Our Own Country

Author: Zhao Juan, Department of Military Psychology, Armed Police Political College, Shanghai 200435)

Abstract: In order to promote the development of my country's target strategic coercion and ensure the realization of national security strategy and national interests, this paper analyzes in detail the cognition and belief, emotion and emotion, needs and motivation, personality and style of decision makers in the target country of strategic coercion. The purpose is to provide assistance for effectively responding to the complex security situation faced by my country during the period of strategic opportunity and enhancing the effectiveness of national strategic authority. Key words: strategic coercion; decision-makers in target countries; decision-making psychology D0I: 10.16807/j.cnki.12-1372/e.2016.07.017 )07-0073-04

Abstract: To promote the strategic deterrence and ensure the strategic objectives examines the psychological factors that affect decision-makers, such as experiences awareness and beliefs, emotions and feelings, demands and motivations, personality and style.T his study aims to enhance the strategic deterrence of our country n the face of the complicated security situation during this age of strategic opportunity. Keywords: strategic deterrence; decision-makers of target countries; psychological factors

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, modern coercion has increasingly become the protagonist on the stage of military struggle as a strategy for total victory of "subjugating the enemy without fighting". At present, my country is in the great historical process of peaceful rise. To firmly grasp the "period of important strategic opportunities that can make great achievements", in addition to needing stronger coordination to resolve international conflicts and crises, we must also have stronger strategic authority to ensure the realization of national interests. Exploring and analyzing the psychological factors of the decision-makers in the target countries of strategic coercion is of great value for promoting the development of my country's target strategic coercion.

# The perceptions and beliefs

Perceptions and beliefs are widely involved in the decision-making process of policymakers in strategically intimidating target countries. In fact, the decision-making process often begins with the attention and perception of a situation of strategic intimidation. In the opinion of political scientists, the perception of the threat of the undermining party by policymakers in the target country is important. If policymakers see another country as a threat, they can

It is often assumed that the other party has both strength and intent to hinder the achievement of its goals or endanger its national security. Memory often provides decision-makers with some information related to their decision-making, or decision-makers must use their memory of others and the impressions of others formed on the basis of this memory to explain the policy of the arrogant party. For example, the U.S. designation of certain countries as evil is rooted in those politicians' memories of the early actions of their leaders. Belief systems are more directly linked to decision-makers' decision-making behavior. Ollie Holsty points out that policymakers act on analysis of the situation and perceptions of other countries, which in turn depend on their belief systems. The knowledge of reality is part of the belief system, and the decision-making and behavior of decision-makers depend in part on the knowledge of reality. For example, in one crisis, the intimidating party ostensibly deployed an armoured corps in an attempt to force the target country to accept its demands, and the target country's decision makers assessed the possibility of war and decided whether to back down. However, assuming that the target country's decision makers learn that the tanks are old and do not have sufficient fuel and supplies to actually take military action, the decision makers will correct their beliefs and the final decision may be very different. Cognition and belief can not only guide decision makers to correctly understand the status quo, and rationally determine whether to challenge the intimidating party, but also induce them to develop cognitive biases through habitual and simplified paths, resulting in the failure of intimidation. Taking predisposition as an example, although the vast majority of correct inferences are also strongly influenced by predisposition, it is often paranoid and aspirational, causing decision makers to reject unfavorable evidence and only look at what they expect to see. to the result. For example, in the past 2015, the world was deeply troubled by security. Traditional security issues and non-traditional security issues intertwined. Conflicts and disasters emerged one after another. Then, fighting terrorism is the primary aspiration of many countries. Once there is trouble, the first thing governments consider is a terrorist attack, and quickly make a response plan. People generally see attacks on terrorists, but rarely see other adverse factors, such as people's helplessness and political factors. Another example is the incident of Turkey's downing of a Russian military plane. People must first think of Russia's military retaliation against Turkey, and eagerly expect it to happen, but the result is a series of sanctions and Braille attacks.

# The sentiment and Moreover, the decision-making of the decision-makers of the standard country under the strategic coercion is often full of

Look at strong negative emotions and emotions, which are related to their methods of challenging their demands and intimidating them. The target country often initiates challenges based on dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the strategic coercion, which is mainly based on threats and force, shows the determination of the intimidating country to completely veto the challenger’s intention to challenge. In this way, hatred, hostility, hatred, fear, despair, and anxiety and tension induced by crisis situations based on obstructed interests and desires run through the decision-making process of the decision-makers in the benchmark country. Fear is the most important emotional issue for decision makers in the target country, and it stems from the perception of one's own vulnerability to attack by other countries, which is almost universal in international politics. Fear, hostility, and military readiness of one adversary prompt the same response in the other, resulting in an escalating spiral of arms races between them, known as the "fear dilemma." Simply put, the fear dilemma is that the actions of one country's policy makers to eliminate fear will inevitably increase the fear of other countries' policy makers. In fact, whether it is the theoretical concept of more than 2,000 years since Thucydides, or historical examples such as the origin of the Peloponnesian War and the US-Soviet Cold War, all show the "fear dilemma", the "psychodynamics of conflict escalation" " is a major constant motivation in international relations1]. Howard believes that part of the cause of World War I was the increase in German power and the resulting fear of Britain. In order to ease Tokyo's policy during World War II, the United States and Western European countries first froze Japanese property and then imposed an oil embargo on Japan. The result has sparked fears among Japanese leaders that it will deprive them of the means to continue their rivalry with China and ultimately lead to the loss of any advantage. "Correspondingly, it created a sense of despair in Tokyo, which was a basic prerequisite for the subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor." The terror threat in 2015, which engulfed most of the population in a sense of fear, led to a large influx of refugees. people Europe. According to the European Commission forecast, by the end of 2016, the total number of refugees entering Europe will reach 3 million. This has laid a legal foundation for countries to send troops into Syria to fight terrorist organizations. To this end, French President Francois Hollande stressed that the fight against terrorism "is not over yet"; European countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy and other European countries have declared war on terrorism; Nigeria and Cameroon have pledged to "do whatever it takes" to combat "Boko Haram extremist groups, etc." It is also fear, but the fear caused by the ultimate weapon can greatly inhibit the desire of decision-makers to challenge. Khrushchev once said that (in a nuclear war) the living will be jealous of the dead. Because no one can predict that once a nuclear war starts, The destruction effect caused by the world, so the Soviet and American policymakers had to restrain their own behavior while being vigilant about the opponent's direction. Kenneth Waltz pointed out that during the Cold War, the "fear of the whole beast sacrifice" between the United States and the Soviet Union for the nuclear war was in the previous countries.

never appeared in the relationship. Today's threat of nuclear war has changed, but panic still plays a restraining role. The threat and counter-threat situation caused by strategic coercion can easily induce the nervousness of the decision makers of the target country. Under great pressure and high tension, decision makers' cognition may be completely different from usual, and even policy and behavior patterns may change, such as increased random behaviors, increased error rate, moving toward simpler and primitive response patterns, and adopting forceful responses. Problem solving, distraction, and reduced tolerance for ambiguity, among others. Holsty confirms that threatening tactics can significantly "increase the tension that forces the other side to take action," which in turn increases the urgency of time and the danger of policymakers relying on those single, familiar options , regardless of whether these solutions are effective solutions to current problems. Research on World War I, the Korean War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates that as tensions rise during crises, interactions between target country policymakers and intimidating parties diminish and become more stylized. At present, both the United States and Russia are developing and deploying strategic missile hypersonic glide warheads, which can theoretically break through any existing air defense system. In terms of developing new conventional means of strategic coercion, the United States, Russia and other countries are competing to develop conventional strategic containment capabilities centered on large-scale "global rapid strike" capabilities. On the basis of the establishment of the Global Strike Command in 2009, the U.S. military formulated a vision of "global rapid strike" before 2030, and developed a hypersonic cruise aircraft based on the SR-51A, which will integrate technology with aerospace aircraft to form an aerospace integration. The hypersonic aviation-spaceflight general-purpose platform will be used as our platform to upgrade the "global rapid strike" system to the "global instant strike" system, which poses a huge challenge to the existing nuclear weapons-based strategic containment system, which also forms tension between the two sides. pressure chain.

The needs and motivations of policy makers in target countries have been widely recognized as important variables that lead to the failure of coercion. John Vasquez concluded that, at the individual level, conflicts erupted from the strong security needs and frustration motives of decision makers. Dignity-related "face" is an important class of needs and behavioral motives that compel decision-makers to take action. U.S. President Kennedy found that policymakers are often forced to respond to the actions of the other party for “face” reasons, which in turn will lead to a response from the other party, which ultimately leads to an escalation of armed conflict. .1] Karen Horney believes that those "fanatical pursuit of honor" decisions Those who choose to do it in the form of external challenges. According to another study on the desire for power, the greater the desire for power displayed by the decision makers, the more aggressive the government will be [2]. The needs and motivations described above all seriously affect the stability of strategic authority. Often, overpowering needs and motives can easily induce a motive bias that can lead to a failure of coercion. Motivational biases are mostly produced in three ways. First, policymakers in target countries feel the need to address pressing domestic threats, including resolving internal conflicts, securing the ruling position of policymakers and their parties, and even protecting sectoral interests. Due to the difficult situation in the country, on the one hand, policy makers begin to believe that these threats can only be solved by challenging the intimidating party and changing the status quo. You don't have to cause war to be successful. Second, when policy makers have identified a policy and are charged with implementing it, leaders themselves often underestimate the inherent dangers inherent in the policy because they are under considerable pressure to achieve policy goals. , because the established policy must succeed. During World War II, when Japan decided to attack Britain and the United States, its leaders did not know that they would face a very unfavorable international situation and balance of power. However, for Japan at that time, conquering China was an established national policy, and the US oil embargo made Japan feel that there was no way out [3]. Therefore, Japanese leaders tend to believe that the United States will fight a limited war and make peace with Japan on the basis of Japanese control of East Asia. Third, policymakers want to avoid the inner pain caused by value trade-offs. For policymakers who have decided to challenge, deciding not to go to war means they will have to change their policies, beliefs and values. For this reason they often have to believe that the war is short-term, because if this were not the case they would be in unbearable pain. Under the dominance of motivational biases, policymakers in target countries usually no longer conduct careful investigations of adversary responses, tending to ignore adversary positions and whether they may be forced by the same strategic and political needs. Take a hard line in defending their interests, rejecting and ignoring all information that contradicts the successful achievement of their goals. Examining nearly 20 cases, Lebeau and Stein confirmed that war-risk makers focused more on their own strategic and domestic political interests and less on the interests, military capabilities, and resolve of their adversaries, even when to demonstrate its will and actively develop military capabilities. The Egyptian-Israeli cases examined by Stein reveal a coherent and exclusive focus of Egyptian leaders on their own purposes and political needs and constraints. They spoke of Egypt's inevitable

The Sinai Peninsula must be liberated, and the humiliation of 1967 must be cleared by launching a successful military operation. By contrast, those things that must be considered, Israel's interests and possible responses, were not at all obvious to the Egyptian leaders.

# The personality and

The decision makers of the bidder country under strategic coercion are widely influenced by their temperament, character, will, sensitivity to the external environment, and their interest in foreign affairs, which they have been trained and demonstrated in the political, military and diplomatic fields. The influence of personality characteristics such as ability is reflected in different styles of decision-making, such as decisive type, tenacious type, over-consideration type, tough type, gentle type, flexible and pragmatic type. Personality and style usually come into play in 3 categories: when the decision maker is in absolute dominance: in times of crisis: when the decision maker is faced with a lot of uncertainty. Different personalities and styles can cause decision makers to make radically different choices about whether to challenge an intimidating party. Two social psychologists demonstrate that those consistently belligerent political leaders do indeed have certain clearly identifiable personality traits that are related to the notion of men's compensatory traits and the psychological archetypes described by Adorno et al.[ 4]. John Vasquez found that the contrasting personality traits of "hardliners" and "accommodationists" can affect human relationships (hostile or cooperative) at almost any time. The research on interpersonal dominance and control desire, introversion and extroversion pointed out that individuals with strong desire to dominate are more likely to use military force than individuals with weak desire to dominate; extroverted individuals are more inclined to resolve disputes through diplomacy, develop and Improve relations with other countries. A study of non-senior decision makers in foreign policy establishments has reaffirmed the relationship between personality factors and willingness to use force. People who are suspicious of everything, lack self-confidence, like to fight with others, are very active, and ambitious are more supportive of the use of force than other personality types. If the decision makers of the target country have serious personality disorders and personality disorders, they will be difficult to stop. Under normal conditions, national leaders are unlikely to have extreme personality variations.

Because as a departmental leader or even a national leader in an important position, they must have the ability to lead and manage the entire organization well for a long time. Those who think and act strangely have a hard time occupying leadership positions, or less likely to be promoted. However, in times of great social and political upheaval, when people with normal personalities are unable to deal with social problems, it is possible for people with abnormal personalities to gain power. Hitler, for example, came to power amid high inflation and soaring unemployment in Germany, and Saddam came to power during a turbulent time of domestic revolution. The leadership behavior of these individuals is likely to become increasingly abnormal over time. Research into Hitler's Basic Personality Disorders revealed that Hitler's personality became even more abnormal 10 years after he came to power. For this type of personality disorder, especially the war paranoid, commonly known as the "madman who wants to start a war", strategic coercion often does not work easily. Now, the personality characteristics of commanding officers, especially leaders, have become a normative study. How to cultivate healthy personality has also become an urgent subject for psychologists

# 5 Conclusion

The realization of strategic goals is easily affected by decision makers' cognition and belief, emotions and emotions, needs and motivations, personality and style and other psychological factors. Investigating and understanding the relevant psychological factors of decision makers on both sides of the strategic goals will ensure the realization of my country's strategic goals. National security and territorial integrity and people's happiness and well-being are of great significance and value.

# references

Shi Guhong, The Security Dilemma and the Necessity of the East Asian Regional Security System, Strategic Management, 2000 (4): 87. 2] Morton Berkowitz. The Political Background of American Foreign Policy [M]. 2nd Edition. Beijing: Commercial Press, 2013: 168-169 3 Bruce Lassiter, Harvey Starr. World Politics [M]. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2001: 247 41 ROBERT JERVISR. Deterrence Theory Revisited [J]. World Politics.2009(3).313

(Editor: Zhang Shuo]